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Normative beliefs have been defined as self-regulating beliefs about the appropriateness of social
behaviors. In 2 studies the authors revised their scale for assessing normative beliefs about aggression,
found that it is reliable and valid for use with elementary school children, and investigated the
longitudinal relation between normative beliefs about aggression and aggressive behavior in a large
sample of elementary school children living in poor urban neighborhoods. Using data obtained in 2
waves of observations 1 year apart, the authors found that children tended to approve more of
aggression as they grew older and that this increase appeared to be correlated with increases in
aggressive behavior. More important, although individual differences in aggressive behavior predicted
subsequent differences in normative beliefs in younger children, individual differences in aggressive
behavior were predicted by preceding differences in normative beliefs in older children.
It has become increasingly clear that characteristic patterns
of social behavior, and in particular aggressive behavior, emerge
early in life. Past research has shown that, as early as at 12
months of age, children display behavioral styles that are more
or less aggressive across a variety of situations (Holmberg,
1980; Kagen, 1988). By age 8, aggressiveness has become a
relatively stable personality characteristic (Caspi, Elder, & Bern,
1987; Eron & Huesmann, 1990; Farrington, 1990; Huesmann,
Eron, Lefkowitz, & Walder, 1984; Loeber & Dishion, 1983;
Magnusson, Duner, & Zetterblom, 1975; Moffitt, 1990; Olweus,
1979; Robins & Ratcliff, 1980). Although there are differences
of opinion concerning the causes of the statistical continuity of
aggression in the population (see Moffitt, 1993), it is difficult
to find any other childhood factor thai predicts more of the
variation in adult aggression than does childhood aggression.
Although aggression is highly stable, this does not imply that
any single factor is responsible for such behavior. Rather, the
literature strongly suggests that a multitude of factors contribute
to an individual's propensity to behave aggressively. In particu-
lar, individual differences in aggressive behavior seem to be a
product of the interaction of early predispositional factors with
specific learning experiences (Berkowitz, 1993; Dodge, 1980;
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Eron, 1987; Geen, 1990; Huesmann, 1994; Huesmann & Eron,
1989, 1992; Moffitt, 1993). Thus, characteristic patterns of ag-
gressive behavior become more firmly established through a
social learning process as the child develops into an adult.
Many recent learning theories of aggression have emphasized
the central role of cognition in maintaining the stability of ag-
gressive behavior over time and situations (Bandura, 1986; Ber-
kowitz, 1988; Crick & Dodge, 1994; Dodge, 1986; Huesmann,
1982, 1988). A number of cognitive mechanisms have been
delineated, and several empirical studies have demonstrated the
relation of these cognitive mechanisms to aggressive behavior
in both children and adolescents (Dodge, 1980, 1993; Guerra &
Slaby, 1990; Slaby & Guerra, 1988). Many of these models
and studies have focused on the role of specific cognitive infor-
mation-processing skills or operations in the regulation of ag-
gressive behavior.
Although this focus on information-processing operations and
skills has provided a useful framework for an initial understand-
ing of how characteristic styles of social behavior are established
and maintained, it has only vaguely accounted for the role of
organized prior knowledge in regulating such behavior. Further-
more, current reviews of social information-processing models
of behavior such as that of Crick and Dodge (1994) have em-
phasized the role of both latent mental structures and on-line
processing actions. A focus on latent mental structures is consis-
tent with recent research in social psychology that has empha-
sized the importance of cognitive schemata, or abstracted gen-
eral knowledge, in the regulation of behaviors, particularly auto-
matic behaviors. From this perspective, social schemas reduce
an individual's information-processing workload by simplifying
reality, enabling individuals to function in a world that would
otherwise be of paralyzing complexity (Abelson, 1981; Rumel-
hart & Ortony, 1977). The schema concept has been applied to
a range of social information, including information about the
self, others, social roles, and events (Fiske & Taylor, 1991).
Huesmann (1982, 1988; Huesmann & Eron, 1984) introduced
the concept of one kind of cognitive schema, scripts, into the
analysis of aggressive behavior. He argued that aggressive be-
havior is controlled to a great extent by scripts that are encoded,
rehearsed, stored, and retrieved in much the same way as are
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scripts for intellectual behavior. The constancy of such scripts,
once encoded, accounts to a great extent for the stability of
aggression across time and situations.
According to this model (Huesmann, 1988), behaviors sug-
gested by such scripts are filtered through self-regulating beliefs.
Recently, we have identified a particular type of belief, which
we refer to as a normative belief, that not only may play an
important role in filtering out inappropriate behaviors, but also
may affect emotional reactions to others' behaviors and may
stimulate the use of appropriate scripts (Guerra, Huesmann, &
Hanish, 1994; Huesmann, Guerra, Miller, & Zelli, 1992). By
the term normative belief, we mean an individual's own cogni-
tion about the acceptability or unacceptability of a behavior.
Normative beliefs serve to regulate corresponding actions by
prescribing the range of allowable and prohibited behaviors. We
have proposed that a broad spectrum of interpersonal actions
fall under this type of normative regulation, from social conven-
tional behaviors such as appropriate forms of addressing strang-
ers to moral behaviors involving harm to others (Guerra, Hues-
mann, et al., 1994; Guerra, Nucci, & Huesmann, 1994; Hues-
mann, Guerra, Miller, et al., 1992; Huesmann, Guerra, Zelli, &
Miller, 1992). Such beliefs may be situation specific or general.
An example of a situation-specific normative belief would be
"It's okay to hit others if they hit you first." An example of a
general belief would be "It 's okay to hit others."
Normative beliefs thus are defined as individualistic cognitive
standards about the acceptability of a behavior. They should
influence (and be influenced by) mental processing of events,
but they are not the same. For example, as Crick and Dodge
(1994) noted, response evaluation is part of an active response
decision process that is driven partly by moral rules or values
related to beliefs about the acceptability of a behavior. These
mental structures constitute the database that influences an indi-
vidual's on-line processing of social cues. Of course, other fac-
tors, such as affective states and recent stimulus cues, also may
influence how normative beliefs are used in evaluating such a
response.
Our model emphasizes a direct connection between children's
cognitions about the appropriateness of behaviors (i.e., their
normative beliefs) and the information-processing operations
that culminate in the child's behavior. We propose that these
beliefs influence responding in novel situations that require
"controlled processing" as well as in familiar situations in
which cognitive processing is more automatic (Schneider &
Shiffrin, 1977). Normative beliefs may or may not be consistent
with the prevailing social norms, although there should be con-
siderable overlap between an individual's normative beliefs and
the normative beliefs of relevant peers, social groups, and soci-
etal institutions. We propose that these beliefs also serve to
regulate behavior, regardless of whether they are backed by
internal or external sanctions, although beliefs that are supported
by internalized sanctions should be more stable and more resis-
tant to situational influences. Defined in this manner, normative
beliefs are not hard to measure, even in young children (Hues-
mann, Guerra, Miller, et al., 1992; Huesmann, Guerra, Zelli, et
al., 1992).
Several predictions derive from this line of thinking. Of
course, people who are more aggressive should have normative
beliefs that are more approving of aggression. In addition, over
time those people with stronger approval-of-aggression norma-
tive beliefs should become more aggressive. However, particu-
larly with children, it also may be true that engaging in aggres-
sive behavior promotes the development of normative beliefs
approving of aggression as emerging mental structures and on-
line processing exert a reciprocal influence. In any case, one
would expect young children to have less stable beliefs than
older children. Consistent with age and gender differences in
aggression (e.g., Guerra, Huesmann, Tolan, Van Acker, & Eron,
1995), one would expect older children and boys to have beliefs
that are more accepting of aggression, although gender differ-
ences in endorsement of aggression may parallel gender differ-
ences in specific types of aggression most frequently displayed
by boys or girls (e.g., Bjorkqvist, Lagerspetz, & Kaukiainen,
1992; Crick & Grotpeter, 1995). Nevertheless, with different
types of aggression (e.g., direct vs. indirect), relations between
normative beliefs about that type of aggression and correspond-
ing behaviors should be maintained for both genders.
In our own recent studies with children (Huesmann, Guerra,
Miller, et al., 1992; Huesmann, Guerra, Zelli, et al., 1992) and
with adolescents (Slaby & Guerra, 1988), we found a weak
but significant relation between acceptance of aggression and
aggressive and delinquent behavior. In those studies, there also
was a tendency for these relations to be greater among older
children. However, the results were not strong, and we did not
have sufficient longitudinal data to examine adequately develop-
mental trends and causal models for relations between aggres-
sion and beliefs over time. Furthermore, the 35-item belief ques-
tionnaire used in the study with children was too long for young
children and seemed to be measuring more than normative be-
liefs. The questions assessing what we have now defined as
individual normative beliefs were mixed with questions as-
sessing perceived social norms of adults for children's behavior.
In the current studies, we revised our scale for assessing
normative beliefs about aggression, found that it is reliable and
valid for use with elementary school children, and investigated
the longitudinal relation between normative beliefs about ag-
gression and aggressive behavior using two waves of data from
a large sample of elementary school children living in poor
urban neighborhoods. Although these neighborhoods are often
characterized by high rates of youth violence (Fingerhut &
Kleinman, 1990; Hammond & Yung, 1991) and are often de-
scribed as including subcultural groups who follow a "code of
violence" (Anderson, 1990), little empirical research has been
conducted within this setting to examine how children's aggres-
sive behavior varies as a function of their individual beliefs
about the appropriateness of such behavior and whether these
relations vary by gender and age.
Study 1
In Study 1, we derived a revised form of the Normative Be-
liefs About Aggression Scale (NOBAGS) that is appropriate for
elementary school children. We found that it is reliable for a
range of ages, for both genders, and across ethnic groups. As
predicted, normative beliefs about aggression increased in sta-
bility with age. Finally, normative beliefs about both retaliatory
aggression and general aggression correlated with aggressive
behavior, particularly in boys.
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Method
Participants
The participants for this study constituted the initial sample of a large-
scale assessment and intervention study, the Metropolitan Area Child
Study (MACS). This study was conducted in lower income neighbor-
hoods of two midwestern cities, one large city and one midsized city
located approximately 40 miles from the large city. AJ1 participants were
selected through a school recruitment process based on the school's
willingness to participate in both the assessment and intervention phases
of the study. The 16 schools originally selected for participation consti-
tuted those volunteering schools in low socioeconomic, high-crime
neighborhoods who would best contribute to an ethnically diverse sam-
ple. Parent permission was obtained through a multistep procedure.
Using this procedure we were able to obtain an overall permission rate
of 86.6%, resulting in an initial sample of 1,550 first-grade (« - 784)
and fourth-grade (n = 766) children. These children were predominantly
African American (38.3%), Hispanic (36.6%), or White (18.1%). The
sample was about evenly split between boys (48%) and girls (52%).
The proportion of children receiving federally subsidized free lunches
in these schools ranged from 25% to 82%, indicating substantial poverty
within the sample. For a more detailed description of participant selec-
tion and sample characteristics, see Guerra et al. (1995).
Data were collected on this sample at three time points. The initial
data on normative beliefs used for reliability analyses were collected in
the spring of 1991 from all 1,550 children. Data for the validity analysis
were collected in the fall of 1991 at the beginning of the next school
year on the 1,070 children who remained.1 Data for the 1-year stability
analyses were collected in the spring of 1992 on 846 of the 1,070
children (80%) who remained in the same schools and were present at
the reassessment sessions.
Measures
Revised normative beliefs measure. When we began our initial in-
vestigation of normative beliefs (Huesmann, Guerra, Miller, et al., 1992;
Huesmann, Guerra, Zelli, et al., 1992), we recognized a number of
the difficult measurement problems inherent in any attempt to assess
children's beliefs about the acceptability of aggressive behaviors. Chil-
dren's reports could be expected to be highly sensitive to the demand
characteristics of the questioning and to the perceived social desirability
of the possible responses. Children's beliefs could be expected to change
radically with age, and young children might not have any stable beliefs
of their own and might simply respond to situational cues.
In those initial studies (Huesmann, Guerra, Miller, et al., 1992; Hues-
mann, Guerra, Zelli, et al., 1992), we derived a 35-item scale for as-
sessing beliefs about the approval of aggression. Beginning with the
conception that beliefs about aggression are cognitions about the accept-
ability of specific aggressive behaviors in specific contexts, we had
developed a set of 88 questions that might be appropriate for elementary
school children. Taking Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975) categorization of
social behaviors on the basis of "action, target, context, and time"
as a point of departure, we described aggressive acts that varied in
characteristics of actor, target, and provocation. Specifically, these items
varied on four dimensions: severity of provocation, severity of response,
gender of provoker, and gender of responder. The questions followed a
format that Guerra and Slaby (1990; Slaby & Guerra, 1988) had devel-
oped and asked children, "How often do you think is okay:
never, sometimes, often, or always." For example, one question was
"It's okay for a boy, Tom, to hit a girl, Julie, if Julie says something
bad to Tom first." The strong-weak provocation manipulation was ac-
complished by substituting "if Julie hits" for "if Julie says something
bad to." Similarly, the severity of response manipulation was accom-
plished by changing "It's okay for to hit " to "It's okay
for to scream at .''
In the scale's first version, questions were included to assess not only
whether children thought a behavior was acceptable but whether they
thought other children and other adults would think it was acceptable
(similar to our notion of perceived social norms). However, our results
revealed that it did not matter whether one asked a child about whether
the child thought the behavior was okay or asked the child about whether
most children thought the behavior was okay. If a child believed most
children thought it was okay, the child thought it was okay himself or
herself. In other words, the children's normative beliefs were highly
correlated with their perceptions of children's social norms. During the
process of scale refinement in these studies, these items were deleted
along with other items that had low item-total correlations.
The final 35-item scale derived in these studies was tested on a sample
of 293 inner-city, mostly minority second- through fourth-grade children.
The results revealed that one could reliably assess individual differences
in normative beliefs on a variety of subscales with these questions (Hues-
mann, Guerra, Miller, et al., 1992; Huesmann, Guerra, Zelli, et al.,
1992). These included Overall Approval of Aggression at Children (a
= .90), Aggression at Boys (a = .83), Aggression at Girls (or = .84),
Aggression Under Weak Provocation (a = .80), and Aggression Under
Strong Provocation (a = .84). The 3-month stability of scores on the
Overall Aggression at Children scale was .48, with the stabilities on the
subscales ranging from .36 to .47. The children's scores on many of
these preliminary scales also correlated very significantly with their self-
reports of aggressive behavior for both boys and girls and significantly
with peer nominations of aggressive behavior for boys.
Although the results of these initial studies demonstrated that chil-
dren's approval of aggression could be measured reliably, they also
suggested that the scale would benefit from further refinement. The
correlations with actual aggressive behavior were not very significant
except when the aggressive behavior was also measured by self-reports.
The differences one might expect as a function of age and gender were
not large, and the questionnaire was long for use with early elementary
school children. Finally, the questionnaire seemed to be measuring more
than one belief structure. Questions assessing what we have now defined
as personal normative beliefs were mixed wirh questions assessing per-
ceived social norms for adults.
On the basis of these considerations, we created a revised 20-item
scale directed at assessing children's normative beliefs as concisely as
possible. The 20-item scale included 12 of the 35 items from the original
scale and retrained the subscale structure for retaliation questions of
weak versus strong provocation and aggression at boys versus aggression
at girls. We eliminated the questions that did not fit theoretically with
our conception of normative beliefs (e.g., questions about adult beliefs),
questions that did not increase the internal consistency of the scale they
were on because they had little variance (e.g., "It's okay to scream at
someone after being hi t") , and questions that correlated highly with
other questions and did not explain any unique variance of relevance
(e.g., questions with "out of control" as the provocation). Equally
important, to tap the more general normative beliefs about aggression,
we added eight questions that did not include any provocation but simply
asked the child if it was generally okay to use aggression (e.g., "It is
usually okay to push and shove other people around if you're mad").
The resulting 20 items are listed in the Appendix.
It is worth noting that in our initial studies with the 35-item scale,
we had tested forms of each question with the order and direction of
the response choices reversed. We found no difference between the
1 Shortly after the initial assessment of normative beliefs, in the spring
of 1991, two schools with 218 first and fourth graders dropped out of
the study. In addition, over the summer of 1991, 262 children moved,
changed schools, or failed a grade, leaving 1,070 of the original first
and fourth graders on the second- and fifth-grade class lists in the fall
of 1992 (70%). These remaining 1,070 children constituted the sample
for the validity analyses.
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forms, which suggests that positive response bias by more aggressive
participants was not a problem. Nevertheless, half of the questions on
the final form were worded in the positive (' 'OK'') direction and half
in the negative ("wrong") direction to control for any such effect.
Aggression measures. The Peer-Nominated Index of Aggression
(Eron, Walder, & Lefkowitz, 1972) was used to obtain a measure of
each child's aggression. The methodology that we used to obtain peer-
nominated scores for a child has been used for more than 30 years with
demonstrated reliability and validity in several cultures (Huesmann &
Eron, 1986). In this procedure, each child is presented with a printed
page with a list of all boys and girls in his or her classroom, with the
names grouped by gender. The child is asked to circle every name that
fits the question at the top of the page (e.g., "Who pushes and shoves
otiier children?''). The questions assess physical aggression, verbal ag-
gression, and indirect aggression (e.g., "Who makes up stories and lies
to get others in trouble?"). The experimenter paces the children so that
exactly the same amount of time is spent on each question. A child's
score on a scale is derived by taking the number of times the child is
nominated by other children on questions that fall on that scale and
dividing by the total number of times the child could have been nomi-
nated. By this definition peer-nominated scores range from 0
to 1.
The teachers also rated all participants on the Child Behavior Check-
list (CBCL; Achenbach, 1978, 1991). This reliable and well-validated
measure contains a list of 118 behavior problem items that the teacher
rates on a 3-point scale. In this study we analyzed only the 39-item
Aggression scale of the checklist.
Procedure
The measures were administered individually for children in the first
grade and were administered in the child's regular school classroom for
children in the remaining grades. In all cases, the experimenter read the
questions aloud for each measure. For classroom administration, at least
one other assistant was present during administration to monitor the
children. In classrooms with Spanish-speaking children, measures that
had been translated and back-translated were provided, and children
were permitted to choose the language of testing. At least one Spanish-
speaking experimenter was present. No difficulties in understanding the
items were noted.
Results
The reliabilities of the total score and six subscales on the
revised NOBAGS (Normative Beliefs About Aggression Scale)
are shown in Table 1. One can see that not only does the overall
scale and each subscale have substantial internal reliability
within the whole sample, but the reliability holds up within both
genders, within all three ethnic groups, and for both first and
fourth graders. It seems clear that the revised questionnaire,
although much shorter than the original questionnaire, is still a
highly reliable measurement tool.
Given that these children's normative beliefs could be reliably
measured, we examined the relation between these beliefs and
actual behavior. In Table 2 the correlations are presented be-
tween the two aggression measures and the normative beliefs
scale for the validity subsample of 1,070 children. The Total
Approval of Aggression scale, the General Approval of Aggres-
sion scale, the Approval of Retaliation scale, and the four sub-
scales for retaliation all correlated significantly both with peer
nominations of aggression and with teacher ratings of aggres-
sion. The correlations were significantly greater, Williams
r(995) > 18, ps < .001, for every case, between beliefs and
the peer nominations of aggression than between beliefs and
the teacher ratings. The correlations were not high by the stan-
dards of adult personality research, but they were consistently
significant and substantial by the standards of children's person-
ality measurement.
Figure 1 illustrates the meaning of these correlations between
the normative beliefs scales and peer-nominated aggressive be-
havior. In each graph in the figure, the mean aggression score
is plotted for children who scored in the upper quartile, the
middle 50%, or the lower quartile on the Specific Approval of
Aggression scale. One can see that those who score in the upper
quartiles are particularly at risk for aggressive behavior. For
example, those scoring in the upper quartile on the Total Ap-
proval of Retaliation scale were about 0.25 standard deviations
higher on aggressive behavior than the middle group. This is
not a large effect size, but it is big enough to be socially signifi-
cant, as Rosenthal (1986) persuasively argued.
In Table 3 the correlations between the normative beliefs
scales and the stronger correlate, peer-nominated aggression,
are broken down by gender, ethnic group, and grade. The corre-
lations between beliefs and aggression were highly similar for
first and fourth graders; however, the correlations between be-
liefs and aggression for girls were consistently lower than for
boys (significantly lower for the overall score, z — 2.32, p <
Table 1
Reliabilities (Cronbach's Alphas) of Normative Beliefs About Aggression Scale and Subscales
Scale
Total Approval of Aggression
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Table 2
Correlations of Normative Beliefs About Aggression With Aggressive Behavior
for Complete-Data Children (N = 1,015)
Scale
Total Approval of Aggression
General Approval of Aggression
Approval of Retaliation
Approval of Retaliation, Weak Provocation
Approval of Retaliation, Strong Provocation
Approval of Retaliation Against Males
Approval of Retaliation Against Females
Note. CBC = Child Behavior Checklist.



















.01, one-tailed, and for all the subscales, z > 1.65, p < .05,
one-tailed, except strong provocation). With regard to ethnicity,
beliefs generally correlated slightly higher with aggression for
Hispanic children and lower for non-Hispanic White children,
but none of these differences were significant.
The stabilities of the NOBAGS subscales were next estimated
from the stability subsample. These were the children in the 14
schools who continued in the study and who could be located
and tested 1 year after their first testing (n = 846). In Table 4
the stabilities of these children's scores on the normative beliefs




to the next. Although the stabilities were not high, they were
significant statistically and meaningful, particularly considering
the age of the children. However, the scores on the General
Beliefs subscale showed significantly less stability over 1 year
than any of the others (Pearson-Fillon z > 1.91, p < .056, two-
tailed, for Genera] Beliefs vs. Retaliation Against Females; z >
1.95, p < .05, for all others).
A notable result in these stability data is the consistently
lower stability over time of the younger children's normative
beliefs. We had predicted that for younger children, normative
beliefs would be in a more formative stage and would not appear
Low Medium High
Total Approval of Aggression
Low Medium High
















Approval of Retaliation Weak Provocation Approval of Retaliation Strong Provocation Approval of Retaliation Against Males Approval of Retaliation Against Females
Approval of Retaliation Weak Provocation Approval Df Retaliation Strung Provocation Approval of Rataliation Against Mates Approval of Retaliation Against Females
Figure 1. The relation between normative beliefs about aggression and peer-nominated aggressive behavior
for 1,015 elementary school children. The low-, medium-, and high-aggression groups represent approxi-
mately the lowest quartile, the middle 50%, and the upper quartile, respectively.
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Table 3






Overall Female Male American White Hispanic First Fourth
(N = 1,030) (n = 546) (n = 484) (n = 414) (n = 187) (n = 429) (n = 515) (n = 515)
Total Approval of Aggression .22*** .12** .26***
General Approval of Aggression .17*** .08 19***
Approval of Retaliation .20*** .12** .25***
Approval of Retaliation, Weak Provocation .20*** .11** .24***
Approval of Retaliation, Strong Provocation .15*** .10* .18***
Approval of Retaliation Against Males 21*** .15** 27***



































Note. Children in other ethnic groups (n = 40) were not included in correlations.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
as stable as for older children. That prediction was confirmed
because the stability of total beliefs (z = 4.24, p < .001) and
of every subscale (z > 4, p < .001) except General Beliefs
was significantly higher for fourth graders than for first graders.
Given that the internal consistencies of the scales were not lower
for the younger than the older children, the higher stabilities for
older children must reflect a greater stability in true scores.
Study 2
In Study 1 we found that the revised NOBAGS and its sub-
scales are reliable and valid measures of normative beliefs about
aggression for early elementary school children in urban set-
tings. Most normative beliefs about aggression do correlate with
actual aggressive behavior, but less so for girls than for boys.
The correlations with aggressive behavior do not vary signifi-
cantly between ethnic groups or between first and fourth graders,
although the stability of beliefs is certainly lower for first
graders.
In Study 2 we expanded our examination of the relation be-
tween normative beliefs about aggression and actual behavior
by collecting longitudinal developmental data on normative be-
liefs and aggressive behavior. Using data obtained in two waves
of observations 1 year apart, we found that children tended to
approve more of aggression as they grew older and that this
increase appeared to be correlated with an increase in aggressive
behavior. More important, we found that although individual
differences in aggressive behavior predicted subsequent differ-
ences in normative beliefs in younger children, individual differ-
ences in aggressive behavior were predicted by preceding differ-
ences in normative beliefs in older children.
Method
Participants
The longitudinal sample for Study 2 consisted of 1,015 inner-city
children who were in the second (n = 317), third (n - 323), and fifth
(n - 375) grades in the fall of 1991. There were 503 girls and 512
boys in the sample. In discussing the results, we refer to these subsamples
as Cohorts 2, 3, and 5, respectively, after the grade they were in during
the 1991-1992 school year. These children came from the 14 schools
used for the stability analysis in Study 1 and two comparable schools
added to replace the two schools that had dropped out of Study 1 after
the 1990-1991 school year. There were 1,935 children in these grades
in the schools, for whom permission was obtained. The longitudinal
sample of 1,015 was the subset of the children who stayed in school
Table 4
Stabilities of Normative Beliefs About Aggression Scale and Subscales






Overall Female Male American White Hispanic First Fourth
AT = 846) (n = 441) (n = 405) (n = 327) (n = 162) (n = 357) (n = 402) (n - 444)
Total Approval of Aggression .31*** .29*** .30***
General Approval of Aggression .20*** .24*** ,13
Approval of Retaliation .34*** .32*** .35***
Approval, of Retaliation, Weak Provocation .28*** .23*** .30***
Approval of Retaliation, Strong Provocation .32*** .34*** .30***
Approval of Retaliation Against Males .35*** .34*** .36***




































*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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until June 1993 and on whom three waves of data on normative beliefs
and two waves of data on peer-nominated aggression were obtained
between April 1991 and June 1993. Given that the schools were in high-
mobility urban neighborhoods and that data had to be contributed at
three time points over a 2-year period for a child to remain in the sample,
the sampling rate of 53% is comparable to that obtained in similar
studies. As shown in Guerra et al. (1995), the participants who dropped
out were slightly more aggressive on average than the retained partici-
pants. Such differential dropout (which is typical of aggression studies)
might reduce the obtained effect sizes of relations to aggression, but it
will nol affect the Type I error rate for the hypotheses tested about
aggression.
Procedure
R>r Cohorts 2, 3, and 5 in the 14 original schools, Wave 1 data on
aggression were collected during the spring of the 1990-1991 school
year when children were finishing the first, second, and fourth grades,
respectively. Wave 1 data on normative beliefs were collected for Cohorts
2 and 5 in these schools at the same time. However, Wave 1 data on
normative beliefs were collected for Cohort 3 at the start of their third-
grade year in the fall of the 1991-1992 school year. Similarly, all Wave
1 data for the children in the two new schools (Cohorts 2, 3, and 5)
were collected in the fall of the 1991-1992 school year. During Wave
2 only normative beliefs data were collected. Wave 2 data were collected
for all children in Cohorts 2, 3, and 5 in all schools in the spring of the
1991-1992 school year when they were finishing the second, third, and
fifth grades, respectively. During Wave 3 both normative beliefs data
and peer nominations of aggression were collected again. Wave 3 data
were collected for all children in Cohorts 2, 3, and 5 in all schools in
the spring of the 1992-1993 school year when they were finishing
the third, fourth, and sixth grades, respectively. The measures and data
collection procedures were identical to those used in Study 1.
Results
We first examined how the mean score obtained on the NO-
BAGS Total Approval of Aggression scale varied with gender
and age. In Figure 2 the means are plotted separately for boys
and girls in each cohort at each of the three measurement points.
Boys approved of aggression more than girls in every cohort
and grade. For both genders, approval of aggression increased
steadily with grade, but it particularly increased between first
and second grade. The age trends and gender differences shown
in Figure 2 were statistically significant. A multivariate repeated
measures analysis of variance revealed significant gender ef-
fects, F{\, 1009) = 80.5, p < .001, significant cohort effects,
F(2, 1009) = 50.2, p < .001, significant grade effects within
cohort, F(2, 1008) = 33.3, p < .001, and a significant Cohort
X Grade interaction, F(4, 2016) = 4.89, p < .001, with a
significant quadratic trend, F( 2, 1009) = 7.94, p < .001, caused
by the large increase from first grade to second grade in Co-
hort 2.
Next, using this longitudinal sample, we investigated the rela-
tion of normative beliefs to aggression and of aggression to
normative beliefs over time. Although beliefs were measured
at three points in time (1991, 1992, and 1993), the first two
measurements were separated by only 6 months for about one
third of the participants, as described earlier. In addition, aggres-
sion was measured only at two points: spring 1991 and spring
1993. Therefore, we combined the first two measurements of
normative beliefs by taking an average and analyzed the data as
a two-wave panel design using the combined measure as a pre-
dictor variable for aggression.
Using multiple regression equations (see Figure 3), we com-
pared how well one could predict Wave 3 aggression from
earlier normative beliefs and aggression with how well one
could predict Wave 3 normative beliefs from earlier normative
beliefs and aggression. These regressions were conducted sepa-
rately for each cohort with gender included in the models. Al-
though the mean scores for girls on beliefs and aggression were
lower, and, as Study 1 showed, the correlations for girls between
beliefs and aggression were lower, the direction of the correla-
tions was the same for both genders. When we first tested the
basic regression model predicting change in aggression from
earlier aggression and normative beliefs for all participants com-
bined, we found a significant cohort effect (p < .04) and a
suggestion of a Cohort X Beliefs interaction [p < .15), but no
hint of a gender effect {p > .3)oraGender x Beliefs interaction
(p > .5). Furthermore, separate gender regressions did not pro-
duce a single significantly different regression coefficient for
boys and girls. Therefore, we combined genders and conducted
the regressions separately by cohort.
2nd Grade Cohort 3rd Grade Cohort 5th Grade Cohort
15
GENDER
Figure 2. Developmental trends in normative beliefs for second-grade (n = 317), third-grade (n = 323),
and fifth-grade (n = 375) cohorts of children.
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In Figure 3 the results of these regression analyses are dia-
grammed separately for Cohorts 2, 3, and 5. These regressions
revealed substantial cohort differences and are illuminating. For
the youngest children, as one would expect from Study 1, there
was little stability in normative beliefs about aggression, and
initial normative beliefs were not good predictors of later norma-
tive beliefs. Nor did early normative beliefs add at all to the
prediction of later aggression for these young children. However,
a young child's level of early aggressive behavior was a signifi-
cant predictor of the child's later normative beliefs about aggres-
sion {p = .20, p < .001). In other words, aggressive behavior
on the part of these young children seemed to increase their own
approval of aggression, but their approval or lack of approval of
aggression did not influence their behavior much.
As the children grew older, however, the situation changed.
For Cohort 3, as these regressions show, normative beliefs be-
came more stable, that is, predictable from initial normative
beliefs (/3 = .27, p < .001, vs. /? = .08, ns. for Cohort 2) ,
f(633) = 2.19, p < .03, for difference. Normative beliefs also
were no longer predictable from previous aggressive behavior
((3 = .06, ns, vs. /? = .20, p < .001, for Cohort 2), r(633) =
2.41, p < .02, for difference. At the same time, normative beliefs
began to significantly predict individual differences in aggres-
sive behavior (p — .08, p < .05). For children in the fifth-grade
cohort, the change was pronounced. Normative beliefs now were
a highly significant predictor over time of changes in aggressive
behavior (p = .16, p < .001, vs. p = .07, ns, and p = .08, p
< .06, for the second- and third-grade cohorts, respectively),
/(633) = 1.67, p < .10, for difference. Within the fifth-grade
cohort, a 1.00-standard deviation difference in approval of ag-
gression between children in the fourth grade was predictive of
a 0.16-standard deviation difference in aggression in the sixth
grade even with the effects of early aggression partialed out.
Children whose normative beliefs revealed greater approval of
aggression increased in aggression beyond what one would ex-
pect from their early aggression. In other words, normative be-
liefs approving of aggression seem to lead to more aggressive
behavior.
In Figure 4 the longitudinal relations between normative be-
liefs about aggression and aggressive behavior are graphed sepa-
rately for the youngest (Cohort 2) and oldest (Cohort 5) cohorts.
Although the regression analyses reflect only linear effects,
these graphs represent the best quadratic functions that fit
the longitudinal data. They help clarify the meaning of the
regressions.
Looking at the Cohort 2 plot with aggression on the vertical
axis (lower left quadrant), one can see that in the youngest
cohort, higher initial scores on aggression were predictive of
higher later aggression for all levels of normative beliefs, but
particularly for children who initially had low beliefs approving
of aggression. At the same time, for children who were low on
aggression, higher initial scores on normative beliefs predicted
Figure 3 (opposite). Multiple regression analyses relating normative
beliefs and peer-nominated aggression over a 3-year span for second-
grade (n = 317), third-grade (n = 323), and fifth-grade (n = 375)
cohorts of children. PRAGG = Peer-Nominated Aggression score; NO-
BAGS = Total Approval of Aggression score on Normative Beliefs
Scale. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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COHORT 2 COHORT 5
Figure 4. Graphs of best fitting quadratic functions relating Wave 3 aggression or normative beliefs to
earlier aggression and normative beliefs for the youngest (Cohort 2) and oldest (Cohort 5) cohorts.
slightly higher subsequent aggression. The Cohort 2 plot with
normative beliefs on the vertical axis presents (upper left quad-
rant) a more complex picture. For children low to moderate on
initial beliefs approving of aggression, engaging in aggressive
behavior strongly predicted high later beliefs approving of ag-
gression. However, for children already moderate to high in their
approval of aggression, engaging or not engaging in aggressive
behavior did not add much to the later prediction of beliefs.
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Again, for children who were low on aggression, normative
beliefs did seem to predict subsequent normative beliefs.
The graphs for Cohort 5 are more straightforward. The graph
with normative beliefs on the vertical axis (upper right quadrant)
shows that for these older children, higher initial normative
beliefs approving of aggression were predictive of higher subse-
quent normative beliefs approving of aggression regardless of
initial level of aggressive behavior. For children this old, differ-
ences in initial levels of aggressive behavior did not predict
differences in later beliefs. The graph with peer-nominated ag-
gression on the vertical axis (lower right quadrant) shows that,
as with the younger children, aggression by older children was
a strong predictor of subsequent aggression. More important,
though, unlike the case with the younger children, higher norma-
tive beliefs approving of aggression were highly predictive of
higher aggression in these older children. In fact, the quadratic
term for normative beliefs in predicting aggression was statisti-
cally significant in this model, £(393) = 2.2, p < .03.
In conjunction, the path analyses in Figure 3 and quadratic
models in Figure 4 suggest that aggressive behaving on the part
of very young children seems to increase their own approval of
aggression, but their approval or lack of approval of aggression
does not influence their behavior much. In older children, on
the other hand, their behavior no longer seems to influence
changes in approval of aggression much, but their normative
beliefs about the appropriateness of aggression seem to exert a
substantial influence on their aggressive behavior.
General Discussion
Normative beliefs have been defined as self-regulating beliefs
about the appropriateness of social behaviors. They are pre-
sumed to be related to perceived social norms but need not
necessarily be consistent with those norms. Normative beliefs
can be viewed as cognitive abstractions of knowledge acquired
through observation, experience, and direct tuition.
In the current research, we derived a short self-report ques-
tionnaire to assess a child's normative beliefs about the appro-
priateness of retaliatory aggression and aggressive behavior in
general. We found that these beliefs could be measured reliably
with our self-report measure in children as young as first grade
regardless of gender or ethnicity. However, children's normative
beliefs about aggression appear to be in a great state of flux in
the early elementary years. There was virtually no stability in
children's beliefs between the first and second grade, with mod-
erate stability becoming apparent by the fourth grade.
Children's normative beliefs about aggression correlated sig-
nificantly with their actual aggressive behavior, even in the first
grade. The correlations with aggressive behavior were not high
but were significant both for beliefs about the appropriateness
of retaliation and for general beliefs. Furthermore, those who
scored in the upper 25% of children on normative beliefs ap-
proving of aggression scored about 0.25 standard deviations
higher than average children on aggression. Normative beliefs
correlated somewhat higher with a child's aggressive behavior
as rated by the child's peers than as rated by the child's teacher,
perhaps because teacher ratings tend to be much more skewed
(Guerra et al., 1995). There were no significant differences in
the correlations across ethnic groups, but the correlations be-
tween beliefs and behaviors were significantly higher for boys
than for girls. This difference may reflect the fact that the aggres-
sion measure assesses both the direct kinds of aggression that
are more common in boys and the indirect kinds that are more
common in girls, whereas the normative beliefs measure as-
sesses only beliefs about direct aggression.
Both normative beliefs approving of aggression and actual
aggressive behavior increase with age during the early elemen-
tary years, so the correlations between beliefs and behavior
aggregated across grades were higher than the correlations
within grades. Approval of aggression showed its largest in-
crease between the first and second grades, suggesting that the
socialization processes of the earliest elementary grades may
be contributing to children becoming more accepting of aggres-
sion. In the high-risk, urban environments represented by the
population of children studied, first graders may be learning for
the first time many hard lessons about how to behave to survive
in a peer culture in which aggression is endemic.
The longitudinal analyses of the different cohorts' develop-
ment of beliefs and aggression are consistent with such a learn-
ing model. We were able to show that individual differences in
first and second graders' aggressive behavior were predictive
of the individual differences in their normative beliefs about
aggression as third graders. This was not true for fourth and
fifth graders. Instead, for them, individual differences in their
normative beliefs about the appropriateness of aggression pre-
dicted how aggressively they behaved as sixth graders. In fact,
the best fitting model suggested that aggressive behavior is a
quadratically increasing function of normative beliefs approving
of aggression for older elementary school children.
This pattern of results is consistent with a developmental
learning model in which the early elementary school years are
particularly critical for the development of normative beliefs
about social behavior. We propose that first graders develop
normative beliefs on the basis of their own behavior and how
it is reinforced; from observing others' behaviors; and through
direct tuition they receive from peers, parents, and others. Thus,
their early normative beliefs are unstable, and their early behav-
ior predicts their later beliefs. However, once their beliefs are
crystallized, they become resistant to change and thus more
stable and less predictable over time from previous behaviors.
At that point, their beliefs predict their subsequent behaviors.
What kind of social-cognitive processes in individual chil-
dren would produce this pattern of results? That a child adopts
beliefs consistent with his or her own behavior is not surprising
and would be predicted by most theories of cognitive consis-
tency. Of more interest are the processes through which these
beliefs, once adopted as normative beliefs, affect subsequent
behavior. Although we did not attempt to investigate alternative
mechanisms that might be responsible for the influence of nor-
mative beliefs about aggression on aggressive behavior, we
hypothesized previously that there are at least three ways in
which normative beliefs affect children's aggressive behaviors
(Guerra, Huesmann, et al., 1994; Huesmann, 1988). First, chil-
dren's normative beliefs may affect the way in which they per-
ceive the behaviors of others. The more they approve of aggres-
sion, the more likely they may be to perceive hostility in others,
even if no hostility is present. Second, normative beliefs in
support of aggression may cue the retrieval of aggressive scripts
for social behavior. Finally, if normative beliefs act as filters to
eliminate "inappropriate" behaviors from children's reper-
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toires, the children with more aggressive normative beliefs will
be less likely to reject aggressive behaviors once they have
thought of them.
Tests of these specific hypotheses must await additional re-
search. However, on the basis of the current findings, it seems
fair to conclude that children's normative beliefs about aggres-
sive behavior are influenced by their own early social behaviors,
become moderately stable in the early elementary grades, and
exert a powerful influence on subsequent social behavior after
that time.
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Appendix
The 20 Items on the Normative Beliefs About Aggression Scale
Response Choices
IT'S PERFECTLY OK
IT'S SORT OF OK
IT'S SORT OF WRONG
IT'S REALLY WRONG
The choices are ordered to agree with the framing of the question;
so "REALLY WRONG" is the first alternative for WRONG questions
and "PERFECTLY OK" is die first alternative for OK questions.
Instructions
The following questions ask you about whether you think certain
behaviors are WRONG or are OK. Circle the answer that best describes
what you think. Circle ONE and only one answer.
Retaliation Belief Questions
Suppose a boy says something bad to another boy, John.
1) Do you think it's OK for John to scream at him?
2) Do you think it's OK for John to hit him?
Suppose a boy says something bad to a girl.
3) Do you think it's wrong for the girl to scream at him?
4) Do you think it's wrong for the girl to hit him?
Suppose a girl says something bad to another girl, Mary.
5) Do you think it's OK for Mary to scream at her?
6) Do you think it's OK for Mary to hit her?
Suppose a girl says something bad to a boy.
7) Do you think it's wrong for the boy to scream at her?
8) Do you think it's wrong for the boy to hit her?
Suppose a boy hits another boy, John?
9) Do you think it's wrong for John to hit him back?
Suppose a boy hits a girl.
10) Do you think it's OK for the girl to hit him back?
Suppose a girl hits another girl, Mary?
11) Do you think it's wrong for Mary to hit her back?
Suppose a girl hits a boy.
12) Do you think it's wrong for the boy to hit her back?
General Belief Questions
13. In general, it is wrong to hit other people.
14. If you're angry, it is OK to say mean things to other people.
15. In general, it is OK to yell at others and say bad things.
16. It is usually OK to push or shove other people around if you're
mad.
17. It is wrong to insult other people.
18. It is wrong to take it out on others by saying mean things when
you're mad.
19. It is generally wrong to get into physical fights with others.
20. In general, it is OK to take your anger out on others by using
physical force.
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